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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/896,061	06/29/2001	David J. Schmitz	11927/90	9465
757 7590 09/22/2009 BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE P.O. BOX 10395 CHICAGO, IL 60610			EXAMINER POINVIL, FRANTZY	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3696	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			09/22/2009	PAPER

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1 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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4 BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
5 AND INTERFERENCES  
6

7  
8 *Ex parte* DAVID J. SCHMITZ,  
9 EILEEN SMITH,  
10 and  
11 ANTHONY MONTESANO  
12

13  
14 Appeal 2009-003978  
15 Application 09/896,061  
16 Technology Center 3600  
17

18  
19 Decided: September 22, 2009  
20

21  
22  
23 *Before:* MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, HUBERT C. LORIN, and ANTON  
24 W. FETTING, *Administrative Patent Judges.*

25  
26 CRAWFORD, *Administrative Patent Judge.*  
27

28  
29 DECISION ON APPEAL

1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2 Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2002) from a final rejection  
3 of claims 1, 3 and 6 to 23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)  
4 (2002).

5 Appellants invented an automated trading method including the step  
6 of automatically routing a first remaining portion of an electronic order to a  
7 firm participation subsystem which assigns a percentage of the contra-side  
8 of the order to the participant that sent the order (Spec. 1, 8, and 10).

9 Claim 1 under appeal reads as follows:

10 1. A method of trading products over an  
11 automated execution system, comprising:  
12 receiving an electronic order for a product  
13 submitted by a participant into the automated  
14 execution system, the automated execution system  
15 having a book process subsystem, a firm  
16 participation subsystem and a market maker  
17 subsystem;  
18 automatically executing an initial  
19 portion of the electronic order against a stored  
20 order in the book process subsystem;  
21 automatically routing a first remaining  
22 portion of the electronic order to the firm  
23 participation subsystem, wherein a percentage of  
24 the first remaining portion of the electronic order is  
25 assigned by the automated execution system and  
26 executed against the participant; and  
27 automatically routing a second  
28 remaining portion of the electronic order, if any, to  
29 the market maker subsystem, wherein the second  
30 remaining portion of the electronic order is  
31 executed against another participant.

32 The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on  
33 appeal is:

1           Lupien                                   US 5,101,353                   Mar. 31, 1992

2           The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, and 6 to 23 under 35 U.S.C.  
3   § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lupien.

4

5                                   ISSUE

6           Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting the  
7   claims because Lupien does not disclose or suggest automatically routing a  
8   first remaining portion of the electronic order to the firm participation  
9   subsystem?

10

11                                   FINDINGS OF FACT

12           Appellants disclose an automatic trading system that routes an  
13   electronic order from a participant to an order routing system 108 (Fig. 1).  
14   The participant places the electronic order on behalf of a customer (Spec. 3).  
15   The order routing system 108 routes the order to an automatic execution  
16   system which includes a book process subsystem 116, a firm participation  
17   subsystem 120 and a market maker subsystem 124 (Spec. 8, Fig. 1).  
18   Electronic orders are received at the book process subsystem 116 and the  
19   order is executed when the book contains a resting order which matches the  
20   electronic order (Spec. 9). Any remaining portion of the electronic order is  
21   automatically routed to the firm participation subsystem 120 which  
22   determines if the participant is entitled to participate in the order and if so a  
23   predetermined percentage of the electronic order is executed in the firm  
24   participation subsystem. If a second portion of the electronic order remains

1 after the execution of the firm participation subsystem portion is executed,  
2 that second remaining portion is routed to and executed by the market maker  
3 subsystem (Spec. 9).

4 Lupien discloses a method and system for trading products (Abstr.).  
5 The method includes routing an electronic order for a product submitted by a  
6 participant into an automated execution system (col. 12, ll. 53 to 66. The  
7 user places an order to buy or sell a security at a certain price or better and  
8 the controller CPU 10 stores and maintains a book of the orders (col. 12, ll.  
9 58 to 64). The Lupien system matches buy and sell orders (col. 13, ll. 25 to  
10 27). Lupien discloses that partial order matches or partial executions cause  
11 the contra side order to split into an order of the correct size and an order  
12 holding the remaining size (col. 14, ll. 32 to 35).

13 Lupien does not disclose a firm participation subsystem that  
14 determines if the participant is participating and if so automatically allocates  
15 a predetermined percentage of the contra-side of the order to the firm  
16 participant.

17

## 18 PRINCIPLES OF LAW

19 In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the  
20 Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of  
21 obviousness. *See In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so  
22 doing, the Examiner must make the factual determinations set forth in  
23 *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Furthermore,  
24 “[‘]there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational  
25 underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’.... [H]owever,  
26 the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific

1 subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the  
2 inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would  
3 employ.” *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting  
4 *In re Kahn*, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

5  
6 ANALYSIS

7 We will not sustain the rejection of the Examiner. The Examiner  
8 admits that Lupien does not disclose routing an electronic order first to an  
9 electronic book then a first remaining portion to a firm participation  
10 subsystem and then a second remaining portion to a market maker  
11 subsystem (Ans. 3 to 4). The Examiner considers this portion of the claim to  
12 be an agreement left between the participant and client within a trading firm  
13 or company and states that such agreement would have been possible as long  
14 as all the entities agree to it (Ans. 4). In the Examiner’s view Lupien  
15 contains all the structural elements to perform the claimed invention and  
16 therefore the claimed invention is obvious in view of Lupien.

17 Claims 1, 10, 17, and claims 3, 6 to 9, 11 to 16, and 18 to 20  
18 dependent thereon are method claims. As such, the Examiner must establish  
19 a factual basis for concluding that the *steps* recited in the claims would have  
20 been obvious in view of Lupien. This the Examiner has not done. In this  
21 regard, the Examiner’s conclusion that the steps would have been possible  
22 and that the structural elements are present does not establish that a person  
23 of ordinary skill in the art would have found the recited steps predictable or  
24 obvious.

25 In regard to claim 21 and claims 22 and 23 dependent thereon, which  
26 are system claims, we do not agree with the Examiner that the firm

1 participation subsystem recited in claim 21 is an agreement left to the  
2 participant and client. The firm participation subsystem is a structure that  
3 performs the function of automatically determining if the participant is  
4 participating in the electronic order and if so automatically allocates a  
5 predetermined percentage of a remaining portion of the order to the first  
6 participant. The Examiner has not established that Lupien teaches such  
7 allocation or that Lupien includes the structure that can achieve the  
8 allocation.

9 In view of the foregoing, we will not sustain the Examiner's rejection.

10

11 CONCLUSION OF LAW

12 On the record before us, Appellants have shown that the Examiner  
13 erred in rejecting the claims.

14

15 DECISION

16 The decision of the Examiner is reversed.

17

18 REVERSED

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25 BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE

26 P.O. BOX 10395

27 CHICAGO, IL 60610